## 2 AC – NATO imperialism inevitable

#### NATO Imperialism inevitable, U.S. controlled cyberspace is still comparatively better than Eastern iron fist.

Business Insider, 2016. (July 14). America’s internet is incredibly free compared to most countries. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/americas-internet-is-incredibly-free-compared-to-most-countries-2016-7

One fact that surprised us — given how much Americans talk about censorship — is how relatively little internet censorship there is in the US. As in zero censorship of the important topics tracked by the free expression watchdog.

Now not everyone has such a rosy assesment of US censorship.

Reporters Without Borders called the US [an Enemy of the Internet](http://12mars.rsf.org/2014-en/#slide2)in 2014, saying "US surveillance practices and decryption activities are a direct threat to investigative journalists, especially those who work with sensitive sources for whom confidentiality is paramount and who are already under pressure."

Freedom House's 2015 report, released in October last year, noted [some concerns about the US](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/united-states), like increasing pressure on private companies to install backdoors and arrests for some people who filmed police actions.

Still, the US looks better than most of the world, ranking sixth out of 65 countries, with [China coming in dead last](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/china).

## 2 AC No link – military race inevitable

#### The Cold War era came to an end in the late 1990s but Russian militaristic growth continues, race to the top persists regardless to action of the AFF.

Josh Holder, Scott Reinhard, and Michael Schwirtz, 2022. (Jan, 27.) 2022.) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/01/27/world/europe/russia-forces.html

A build-up of Russian forces near the border with Ukraine has raised concerns among Western and Ukrainian officials that the Kremlin might be preparing for significant military action, possibly an invasion. This map, compiled by The New York Times, shows troops, tanks and heavy artillery moving into positions that threaten to widen the conflict in Ukraine’s east and potentially open a new front on Ukraine’s northern border, closer to the capital, Kyiv. From there, they can also menace the countries on NATO’s eastern flank.

Russia currently has about 130,000 troops on the Ukraine border, according to Ukraine’s military. U.S. intelligence agencies have assessed that the Kremlin has drawn up plans for a military operation involving up to 175,000 troops that could begin in the coming weeks. While it is not clear whether President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has decided to launch an attack — and Moscow has said repeatedly in recent weeks that it has no plans to do so — analysts say the country is well on its way toward constructing the architecture needed for a significant military intervention in Ukraine.

Much of the buildup so far, according to officials and military analysts, has involved troops and equipment that take time to deploy, including tanks and heavy armor, some of which have traveled by train from bases as far away as Siberia.

Before launching a significant military operation, Russia needs to deploy reserve soldiers and logistical infrastructure, like field hospitals, that until recently appeared to be missing from positions near Ukraine, analysts say. But these elements along with additional troops have been moving into some areas of Russian deployment, Ukrainian and western officials say.

Much of the attention so far has been directed at the buildup of forces near two breakaway provinces ineastern Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk, where the Ukrainian military has been at war with Russian-backed separatists since 2014. The separatist forces, which include Russian troops and Ukrainian fighters opposed to Kyiv’s rule, number about 30,000, according to an assessment by the Ukrainian military.

Since the start of 2021, Russia has moved an additional five battalion tactical groups into the border area near Luhansk and Donetsk, including about 5,000 soldiers sent to reinforce the 12,000 or so stationed there permanently, according to Ukrainian authorities.

Just as significant, according to officials and military analysts, are the forces massing north of Ukraine in areas such as Klintsy, at the point where the Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian borders meet. Russia has also begun ferrying troops, armor, fighter jets and advanced antiaircraft systems into Belarus, a Russian ally and Ukraine’s northern neighbor, putting a growing force within range of Kyiv. Russia’s Defense Ministry says the buildup in Belarus is purely for military exercises scheduled to begin Feb. 10. But, American officials and NATO say these exercises could be a pretext for deploying troops meant to threaten Ukraine and put NATO allies on edge.

## 2 AC Impact turn – Tech Collaboration

#### NATO members are work collaboratively to invent new technology and methods to strengthen cybersecurity on a united front.

NATO, 2022. (Last updated March, 23.) NATO Cyber defense https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_78170.htm

Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive and coercive, and are becoming ever more frequent. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces.

Cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence.

NATO Allies have affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace.

NATO's main focus in cyber defence is to protect its own networks, operate in cyberspace (including through the Alliance’s operations and missions), help Allies to enhance their national resilience and provide a platform for political consultation and collective action.

In July 2016, Allies reaffirmed NATO’s defensive mandate and recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea.

Allies also made a Cyber Defence Pledge in July 2016 to enhance their cyber defences, and have continued to bolster their national resilience as a matter of priority.

NATO reinforces its cyber capabilities, including through education, training and exercises.

Allies are committed to enhancing information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber attacks.

NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams are on standby 24 hours a day to assist Allies, if requested and approved.

In February 2019, Allies endorsed a NATO guide that sets out a number of tools to further strengthen NATO’s ability to respond to significant malicious cumulative cyber activities.

NATO is intensifying its cooperation with industry through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership.

At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which supports NATO’s core tasks and overall deterrence and defence posture to enhance further the Alliance’s resilience.

Allies are promoting a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, and pursuing efforts to enhance stability and reduce the risk of conflict by supporting international law and voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

## 2 AC Impact turn – U.S. cyber freedom

#### Americans are able to roam the cyberspace freely, the U.S. is determined to provide the same access to the rest of the world allowing suppressed groups to fight for their freedom.

The United States Agency for Global Media Retrieved June 16, 2022, from https://www.usagm.gov/office-internet-freedom/

Since 2002, USAGM has been involved in activities to circumvent internet censorship by foreign governments in order to distribute news content and better provide a forum for free expression in closed societies. This portfolio has since grown to be an increasingly critical component of the agency’s ability to fulfill its mission to “inform, engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and democracy.”

USAGM has supported internet freedom projects through the Office of Internet Freedom (formerly the Internet Anti-Censorship Division) and the Open Technology Fund (OTF), USAGM’s newest non-profit grantee.  The USAGM’s internet freedom program supports, per congressional appropriations guidance, global internet freedom for the expansion of unrestricted access to information on the internet.  Over the past seven years, USAGM has invested more than $100 million in projects to promote internet freedom in the world’s most restricted environments.  Together, these programs have supported the tools and systems necessary for USAGM networks to report and disseminate content in information-restrictive markets, and for USAGM audiences to receive and share content safely online.

While previously OIF directly supported certain circumvention at-scale projects, OTF now supports all the agency’s internet freedom needs. OIF’s role is to maintain a strong partnership with OTF, to provide oversight to ensure continued OTF compliance with relevant rules and regulations in the execution of congressionally mandated use of internet freedom funds for technology projects, ensure uninterrupted circumvention services for USAGM entities and their training needs, provide critical field-driven feedback loop, and manage the assessment of particular OTF projects to inform USAGM strategy and oversight.

## 2 AC No impact – No nuclear war

#### Nuclear war unlikely, even Russia understandings this is the last resort.

Valenti, 2022. (Maggie, April 14). How Likely Is A Nuclear War In Europe? Russian Officials Make Threats Amid Risk Of NATO Expansion. International Business Times. https://www.ibtimes.com/how-likely-nuclear-war-europe-russian-officials-make-threats-amid-risk-nato-expansion-3474683

Russian officials have taken a step towards [threatening nuclear war](https://www.ibtimes.com/russia-warns-nuclear-deployment-if-sweden-finland-join-nato-3474026), warning that if Sweden and Finland join NATO, Russia will place nuclear weapons in the Baltic region.

Russian officials have previously stated that if Russia's existence or territory is threatened, nuclear weapons are an option.

Keeping nuclear weapons in the Baltic — [specifically in Russian-controlled Kaliningrad, which sits between Poland and Lithuania](https://www.google.com/maps/place/Kaliningrad,+Kaliningrad+Oblast,+Russia/@54.6849238,20.4501385,13.83z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x46e33d8d4b7c21a9:0x5050960016126ed3!8m2!3d54.7104264!4d20.4522144) — as Russian officials have recently threatened, would make it easier for Russia to target Western countries.

However, threats like these are not uncommon from Russia and nuclear weapons have previously been in the region.

Sweden and Finland are near Baltic countries and have held onto neutrality for a long time, but since have reconsidered their positions after Russia invaded Ukraine. Finland also shares an 830-mile border with Russia and currently around half of the world's nuclear weapons are owned by Russia.

Despite the threats of nuclear war, events like the Cuban Missile crisis, [North Korea](https://www.ibtimes.com/north-koreas-tests-stir-nuclear-debate-south-3473751)n aggression, and Russian threats, governments have not used nuclear weapons during a war since World War II. IN 1945, the U.S. dropped bombs on two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in the first and only time these weapons were used during a war.

Even with the recent heightening of Russian aggression, multiple people have been quick to say that Russian President Vladimir Putin is bluffing, that nuclear war is not in his best interest.

"This threat of escalation . . . is cheap talk. Putin is bluffing. He is deliberately allowing the U.S. intelligence community to discover data about escalation in order to scare us away from helping Ukrainians win," [Michael McFaul wrote in an opinion column for the Washington Post.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/04/13/west-help-ukraine-win-next-phase-russia/)

McFaul argues that the U.S. and Western allies are not doing more to help Ukraine, including providing certain weapons out of fear of Russian escalation. He believes they should be doing more to ensure Ukraine's victory and should ignore Putin's threats.

"Putin is angry and unhinged, but not suicidal," he added.

NATO Secretary-General has [called Putin's threats of escalation](https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-tells-putin-stop-nuclear-saber-rattling-amid-ukraine-war-2022-3) "nuclear saber-rattling."

"Nuclear war can not be won and it could never be fought," he said.

## 2 AC Answers to – Economic impact

#### European countries are hesitant to increase military spending to support NATO’s expansion agenda.

Dr. Roberts, 2020. (Peter, professor at Emory University’s Goizueta Business SchoolNATO 2030: Difficult Times Ahead. (n.d.). Rusi.Org. <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nato-2030-difficult-times-ahead>

Across the Alliance, striking that balance is a dilemma that can become divisive, as some members step up to the fighting part of the requirement, whilst others focus on the high-tech (but much safer) part. The relative investments might be equal in national treasure, but the difference in risk to personnel will be significant.

Should the UK make unilateral decisions (for example on potentially scrapping the Army’s heavy-armoured capability), it will be tempting for the government to argue that the additional capabilities of British Carrier Strike capability, or large numbers of F35s, drones, or new surveillance capabilities, along with a healthy research and development financial allocation, outweigh the potential drawbacks from the removal of tanks from its commitment to NATO’s Order of Battle. The reality, however, is that those new capabilities will not buy out that commitment of a heavy armour formation in the land domain, specifically aimed at countering Russian armoured strength. A NATO threat-based model of force design and employment is realistic and desirable in the current competition against Russia, but cannot be achieved unless member states also adopt the same concept. A divergence in the philosophy of force designs between member states and NATO will mean that the Alliance can generate neither a capability-based force, nor one that matches the threat, [leaving the organisation in a worse position than it is already](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/12/05/commentary/world-commentary/trump-least-natos-problems/#.XuIFBS-ZOfU).

If Stoltenberg is serious about making these military changes, as well as the political and economic ones, he will need to make a more convincing argument to major contributors (the US, France, the UK, and Germany) that their defence budgets and procurement plans need to be NATO-centric, and not merely where national defence plans conveniently coincide with NATO’s. The speed of development of these states is much faster than many other Alliance member states can afford, or have planned for. Yet more transformation might be needed, and there is the risk of developing a three-speed NATO, with the staggering pace of US military development, the slower pace of similar trends in the UK, France and potentially Germany, and the more measured speed of other Allies, which will be largely determined by broad national economic trends and budget allocations.

## 2 AC Answers to - Cyber attack

#### The U.S. is prepared for Russian cyber attacks.

[Blinken, 2022. (Antony J. Secretary of State,](https://www.state.gov/biographies/antony-j-blinken/) May 10.) Attribution of Russia’s Malicious Cyber Activity Against Ukraine. United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/attribution-of-russias-malicious-cyber-activity-against-ukraine/

The United States is joining with allies and partners to condemn Russia’s destructive cyber activities against Ukraine.  In the months leading up to and after Russia’s illegal further invasion began, Ukraine experienced a series of disruptive cyber operations, including website defacements, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and cyber attacks to delete data from computers belonging to government and private entities – all part of the Russian playbook.  For example, the United States has assessed that Russian military cyber operators have deployed multiple families of destructive wiper malware, including WhisperGate, on Ukrainian Government and private sector networks.  These disruptive cyber operations began in January 2022, prior to Russia’s illegal further invasion of Ukraine and have continued throughout the war.

Today, in support of the European Union and other partners, the United States is sharing publicly its assessment that Russia launched cyber attacks in late February against commercial satellite communications networks to disrupt Ukrainian command and control during the invasion, and those actions had spillover impacts into other European countries.  The activity disabled very small aperture terminals in Ukraine and across Europe.  This includes tens of thousands of terminals outside of Ukraine that, among other things, support wind turbines and provide Internet services to private citizens.

As nations committed to upholding the rules-based international order in cyberspace, the United States and its allies and partners are taking steps to defend against Russia’s irresponsible actions. The U.S. Government has developed new mechanisms to help Ukraine identify cyber threats and recover from cyber incidents. We have also enhanced our support for Ukraine’s digital connectivity, including by providing satellite phones and data terminals to Ukrainian government officials, essential service providers, and critical infrastructure operators. We praise Ukraine’s efforts—both in and outside of government—to defend against and recover from such activity, even as its country is under physical attack.